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My purpose in this appendix is to discuss the main principles involved in the
construction of estimates of EERs and EPRs for the years 1949—62. The esti-
mates for later years (1963—71) were based on similar principles, although
the instruments used in export promotion (from 1966 on) were somewhat
different from the methods pursued in earlier years, thus leading to some dif-
ferences in estimating procedures.
ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
IN EXPORTS
Rates for Value Added and Total Value.
The data on effective exchange rates in this volume are for value added
in exports, not for total value. For economic analysis, this is the only useful
concept in the case of Israel. Through a slight transformation, which is ex-
plained below, it yields the effective rate of protection in production for ex-
ports. This would also be the concept to use for time-series analyses of fac-
tors affecting the size of exports in comparisons with, for instance, time series
of GNP prices or wage levels, etc.
The value-added rate does not yield the local price of finished export
goods. But a separate calculation of the effective exchange rate for total value,
designed to correct this omission, would not be warranted in the case of
Israel. For the most part, sales of potential export goods in the local market
205206 APPENDIX B
constitute only a small fraction of total sales in that market; the higher the de-
gree of aggregation in the classification of goods, the more evident this is.
The local market price is thus a function of the exchange rate for imports of
the good rather than for its exports.1 This does not hold for the two large,
traditional export goods—citrus fruits and polished diamonds. But there, too,
the exchange rate for total value would be mostly irrelevant for the purpose
of determining the local price. In the case of diamonds, this is because there
are practically no local sales of the product (in the government's handling
of the industry, it is always assumed that all of the imported raw material—
the unpolished diamonds—is re-exported). In citrus fruit, on the other hand,
local sales are primarily dictated by physical factors which determine the frac-
tion of the crop which, due to its quality, cannot be exported, that is, exports
and local sales are not of exactly the same product. Economic forces are not
absent here altogether: some substitution does exist, and so the level of ex-
port prices does marginally affect the fraction exported. Still, the home price
and the export price diverge radically from each other.
It should be pointed out that the combined use of the drawback system
in exports (which has been in force all along, except for the special import
levy of August 1970) and the premium-payment plan of 1956—61 for net value
added, leads to the establishment of a shadow exchange rate for the import
component in exports which is equal to the exchange rate for value added.
Thus, under such a system, the exchange rate for total value will also be
equal to the exchange rate for value added. This may be explained as follows:
Suppose the producer maintains a given level of exports, but reduces the level
of imported input by one dollar, thus increasing value added by this amount.
This would yield him a saving of expenditure on imports equal to the value
of the formal exchange rate for imports and an increase in premium receipts
equal to the size of the premium rate. Thus, the net revenue created by the
reduction of imports valued at one dollar would be equal to the formal ex-
change rate plus the premium rate; that is, to the effective exchange rate for
value added in exports. The same result follows symmetrically if we sup-
pose that imported input is increased by one dollar.2
Let
X =exports(total value in dollars);
=importcomponent in exports (value in dollars);
RF =formalrate of exchange (Israeli pounds per dollar);
rate of export premium (Israeli pounds per dollar of value added);
Y =revenuefrom export transaction (Israeli pounds).
Y =(X—Mx)(RF+ Rp) + MXRF
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It appears, therefore, that the revenue is the same as if the exporter received
the effective exchange rate per value added for his total exports (X) and was
fined by a payment at the premium rate (Re) on the import component. That
is, the effective exchange rate for value added in exports is the shadow price for
the import component, and this equals the formal rate plus the premium rate
(the rate of the "fine"). In other words, this method is entirely equivalent
to one in which an existing uniform rate is used for exports and the import
component in exports, and which equals the effective exchange rate for value
added in exports.
Rates of Exchange Using Pamaz Rights.
As was stated in the text, the effective exchange rate implied by taking
account of the compensation of exporters in the local market was not esti-
mated systematically and was not incorporated into the exchange rate cal-
culations. The most important compensating device was created by the
Pamaz plan, during the period 1953—59. For the years 1956—59, however,
when both the Pamaz plan and the comprehensive premium plan were in
effect, this omission is only slightly relevant if the effective exchange rate has
to be estimated at the margin, as it would be for most purposes in economic
analysis.
It will be recalled that during those years, exporters who were entitled
to Pamaz rights could opt, instead, for premium payments. If rational be-
havior is assumed, an exporter would be expected to use his Pamaz rights up
to the point at which the marginal revenue derived from use of this right is
equal to the premium, and to sell the rest of his export proceeds (i.e., of his
value added) to the Treasury, at a price equal to the formal rate plus the
premium rate. If an exporter avails himself at all of the premium plan, this
would mean that at the margin the effective exchange rate, using the Pamaz
right, equals the premium rate. The data indicate that in the large majority of
export industries, some use of the premium plan was indeed made. In the
estimates, it was assumed that the effective rate involved in the use of Pamaz
rights was equal to the effective rate created in selling the receipts to the
Treasury. This, then, is not a gross distortion of the correct estimate so far as
the rate at the margin is concerned.
ESTIMATES OF EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
IN IMPORTS: TARIFF DUTIES
Two alternative methods can be used to estimate the exchange rate element
involved in the tariff level for each good. One is to divide tariff revenue by the208 APPENDIX B
dollar value of imports, thus obtaining tariff duties in Israeli pounds per dol-
lar of imports. The other is to apply the formal exchange rate to the tariff
rates specified in the tariff schedule, thus again yielding the tariff in pounds
per dollar. In the estimates constructed here, the second method was used
rather than the first, for two reasons.
One is the well-known problem of timing. Tariff revenues are recorded
when the duties are paid, not when the dutiable imports arrive; that is,
they are recorded on a cash rather than an accrual basis. Dividing the
revenues recorded in one calendar year by the imports recorded in the same
year would thus not be justified in principle; and when long intervals of time
elapse between clearance and payment and the value of imports is not con-
stant—circumstances which are the rule rather than the exception—the error
may be considerable.
But even were there no timing problem, the two alternative methods
would not have yielded the same result, because some imports of dutiable
goods enter duty free. As was explained in the text, this, applies to two cate-
gories: imports destined for use in export production (which are entitled to
drawbacks, and on which in effect no duty is charged to begin with) and im-
ports (such as those of the government, or certain institutions, during parts
of the period) that enjoy "conditional exemption." If the first method of
estimating the tariff level were used, it would have yielded the average tariff
imposed on all three categories: "normal" imports for domestic use, imports
for exports, and duty-free imports under conditional exemption. The inclu-
sion of imports for exports would patently be a wrong procedure: this cate-
gory should not be included in this estimate just as it is not in the estimate
of the effective exchange rate in exports. As was just shown, under the plan
in effect during part of the period the shadow rate of exchange applying to
this category was equal to the effective exchange rate for value added in ex-
ports rather than to the formal rate of exchange, as would be implied by in-
cluding this category and assigning it a zero tariff rate. Inclusion would make
the estimates invalid for use in economic analysis. Similarly, imports subject
to conditional exemption should be excluded if the purpose of the estimate is,
as it should be, to obtain the rate at the margin. For an analysis of protection,
for instance, it is of no consequence that an institution has been granted the
right to import some goods free of duty, as long as these are not resold in the
local market, a condition that has usually been fulfilled.
The estimates used here refer, therefore, only to "normal" (i.e., non-
duty-free) imports for domestic use. For this reason, as well as the timing
problem, the method adopted for estimating was based on tariff schedules. In
aggregating, the weight given to each good was determined by the level of
non-duty-free imports only; these data were available for most of the period.
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computed by using as weights not imports within each subperiod of the year,
but the length of time to which each schedule applied. This was done as a
short cut, and because monthly data on imports are not fully reliable and
weekly data do not exist at all. The error involved in this procedure is prob-
ably sinai!.
For most other components of the import exchange rate (except the
formal rate), the firstmethod—thatof using actual, recorded revenue or ex-
penditure—was followed. This is because these components are not usually
based on any given, predetermined schedule: the profit or loss of the govern-
ment's commercial account, for instance, could not be replaced by some
schedule of profit or loss margins; no such ex-ante schedule is to be found.
Thus, these estimates necessarily suffer from the discrepancies introduced by
the timing problem.
TRANSFORMATION OF EFFECTIVE
EXCHANGE RATES INTO EFFECTIVE
RATES OF PROTECTION
Effective exchange rates for exports refer directly, as has just been explained,
to value added. For import-competing goods, effective exchange rates for
value added have been derived in the way explained in the text; that is, by use
of input-output data, which include import components in each industry de-
tailed by import group, and data on exchange rates for total value (i.e., value
of final good) of each import group. The exchange rate for value added in
industry j(Re,)is obtained as follows:3
let
a1, =coefficientof import i in industryj;
R, =exchangerate for total value (final good) of import i;
=exchangerate for total value of import j.
Then
—E a13R1
These are the values presented in the import-substitution columns in Table
4-6 in the text. As is explained in the text, the values arrived at in this way,
through the use of aggregated input-output data, suffer from a few deficiencies.
In particular, they are biased downward, probably to a substantial degree.
The transformation from the effective exchange rate for value added to210 APPENDIX B
effective rates of protection is technically simple; but it rests on a crucial as-
sumption. If gj is the effective protective rate for value added in industry j,
andis the effective exchange rate for value added in /(whetherfor ex-
ports or in import substitution), then:
or
The crucial assumption concerns the definition and size of k.Ifthis is taken
as the formal rate of exchange, the outcome could have little meaning. If a
positive g, should indicate the existence of positive protection, thenmust
be the equilibrium rate of exchange, or, in practice, as good an approximation
of the equilibrium level as can be conceived. If elasticities were known, R
could be. estimated from the, data on the system of exchange rates, by calcu-
lating an average weighted by both the size of exports or imports of each good
and its price elasticity of domestic supply or demand (assuming, as could
probably be done for Israel without much distortion, fixed foreign prices)
Infact, these elasticities are not known; and making arbitrary assumptions
about them would yield an estimate which is more arbitrary and less defensi-
ble than the one yielded by the procedure adopted here.
It is assumed here, instead, that the government continuously determines
an exchange rate system for exports such that it will yield just the amount of
foreign exchange at which, at the margin, the market value of imports of a
unit of foreign exchange equals the domestic cost of obtaining that unit. On
this assumption, the equilibrium rate of exchange is always the highest ex-
change rate (for value added) granted to exporters. However, it is obvious
that some particularly high rates were accorded to individual industries on
specific and particular grounds, rather than being motivated merely by the
wish to obtain foreign-exchange proceeds for the economy. Therefore, in this
calculation, the value actually selected in each year to represent the equilib-
rium foreign exchange rate was the highest rate granted to a significant part
of total exports.5 The rates thus taken as equilibrium levels were as follows:
1956, IL 2.40 per dollar; and 1957—60, IL 2.65 per dollar.
It should be noted that this derivation of EPRs involves two deviations
from the appropriate definition and estimate of the concept. The stand
for the fractions of total (direct and indirect) import components, whetherCALCULATION OF EERS AND EPRS 211
theindirect component is an input to a tradable or to a nontradable input,
whereas only the latter should have been included. On the other hand, they
stand for coefficients of imports rather than of tradables; that is, they exclude
inputs of exportable materials. It may be assumed that in the case of Israel,
these errors of commission and omission do not affect the result in a signifi-
cant manner.
NOTES
1. Were products completely homogeneous, no product could be both exported and
imported in a country like Israel, where local transportation costs are very low in com-
parison with international transportation costs. No classification of goods is, however,
detailed enough to lead to complete homogeneity; and certainly not a classification, such
as the one used here, of all goods into eighty groups.
2. This presentation, as well as the explanation, is based on David Pines, Direct
Export Premiums in israel, 1952—1958 (Jerusalem: Falk Project for Economic Research
in Israel, 1963; in Hebrew), pp. 78—79.
3. The coefficient is from Michael Michaely, Israel's Foreign Exchange Rate
System, Part III, Appendixes (Jerusalem: Falk Institute, 1970; in Hebrew), pp. 152—159.
The data were prepared by the research department of the Bank of Israel on the basis of
the 1958 input-output estimates.
4. See the discussion in W. M. Corden, "The Effective Protective Rate, the Uniform
Tariff Equivalent, and the Average Tariff," Economic Record 42 (June 1966): 200—2 16.
5. A somewhat broader discussion of this procedure, in a different context, may be
found in Michael Michaely, israel's Foreign Exchange Rate System (Jerusalem: Falk
Institute, 1971; in English), pp. 66—70.